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Manufacturing Chiefly Consent? 
James Busby and the Role of 
Rangatira in the Pre-Colonial Era1
VinCEnt O’MallEy
The story of James Busby’s role as official British Resident in New Zealand 
between 1833 and the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840 has been 
told many times. This paper focuses on one aspect of Busby’s performance 
of those duties which has received comparatively little attention. From the 
outset the British Resident set about creating a centralized body of chiefs 
through which he hoped to indirectly govern the tribes. These efforts ran 
contrary to customary Maori decision-making processes which involved a 
much wider group than rangatira. Though far from a resounding success, to 
a large extent Busby’s efforts to elevate the authority of rangatira for ulterior 
ends set the platform for similar Crown policies pursued after 1840. While 
there were many factors impacting upon the standing of rangatira in the 
pre-Waitangi era, this paper suggests that Busby’s attempts to manipulate 
customary relations in this manner warrant closer attention.
 It was at one time popularly assumed that the series of tribal conflicts 
waged after 1818 and known today as the ‘musket wars’ constituted an 
entirely new type of warfare in Maori society. Inspired by European ideas, 
so the argument went, the Ngapuhi rangatira Hongi Hika set out to establish 
himself as a Napoleon or King George of New Zealand, holding sway over 
a newly-united nation under his own personal leadership.2 Such an argument 
ignored several basic facts concerning the course of these wars, including 
the obvious point that the northern taua rarely took any steps to occupy or 
permanently retain any of the lands they took control of – surely the first 
step in any campaign aimed at establishing one’s dominion. It was also 
based on some entirely erroneous conceptions as to the nature of leadership 
and the role of rangatira in Maori society. Although there were some 
exceptions to this, many early European observers perceived Maori society 
in hierarchical terms – much like the highly class-bound communities from 
which they themselves had come – and viewed the authority of the chiefs 
as absolute.3
 John Savage, who after visiting the north of New Zealand in 1805 
authored the first work focused solely on the country, described the form 
of government he observed at the Bay of Islands to be ‘aristocratical, and 
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hereditary’.4 John Nicholas similarly concluded in his 1817 account of a visit 
to the islands that ‘[t]he power of the chiefs . . . is in general absolute’, though 
he added that ‘in some districts it is restrained by certain limitations, and 
controuled [sic] in a great measure by public opinion.’5 This qualification 
was more general than Nicholas appreciated. At least some early European 
observers came close to appreciating the point. Richard Cruise, who visited 
New Zealand just a few years later, noted that whilst at Hauraki he had 
encountered ‘a person bearing the title of areekee . . . who was said to 
exert a very despotic control over many of the neighbouring chiefs’ but that 
‘in the intercourse he maintained with his countrymen, no more respect 
or distinction was paid to him than to any other chief.’ 6 The missionary 
Samuel Marsden noted during his first visit to New Zealand in 1814 that 
‘there appears to be no middle class of people in New Zealand . . . they 
are all either chiefs or, in a certain degree, slaves. At the same time, the 
chiefs do not give their commands to the people indiscriminately as a body 
with that authority which masters, in civil life, exercise over their servants, 
nor do their dependents feel themselves bound to obey such commands.’ 7
 Frederick Maning, the author of the classic work Old New Zealand, 
observed that ‘the natives are so self-possessed, opinionated, and republican, 
that the chiefs have at ordinary times but little control over them, except 
in very rare cases, where the chief happens to possess a singular vigour of 
character, or some other unusual advantage, to enable him to keep them 
under’.8 Later observers agreed with these assessments. According to Francis 
Dart Fenton, writing in 1857:
No system of government that the world ever saw can be more democratic 
than that of the Maoris. The chief alone has no power. The whole tribe 
deliberate on every subject, not only politically on such as are of public 
interest, but even judicially they hold their “komitis” on every private 
quarrel. In ordinary times the vox populi determines every matter, both 
internal and external. The system is a pure pantocracy, and no individual 
enjoys influence or exercises power, unless it originates with the mass 
and is expressly or tacitly conferred by them.9
Although Fenton and other commentators suggested that rangatira could be 
accorded large powers during times of war, this applied no more widely 
than to their own hapu. George Clarke, a member of the Church Missionary 
Society, concluded that ‘a New Zealander in the field of battle is the most 
ungovernable creature immaginable [sic] for though a Soldier he is quite 
independent and if he likes he will obey the voice of his leader or he will 
not’.10 To the extent that Hongi Hika led any taua, or war party, it was largely 
a matter of persuasion, reputation, force of personality, and by personal 
example, rather than in accordance with any recognized authority. The 
rangatira himself informed Marsden that whilst at war ‘he was feared and 
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respected, but when he was at home they would not hearken to anything 
he might say’.11 Henry Williams, in response to a query as to why one 
war party had not kept a closer formation, was informed that ‘it was their 
usual way for each party to go where they liked, that every one was his 
own chief. Without any one to direct, not only does each tribe act distinct 
from the other, but each individual has the same liberty. If one be bent on 
mischief, he cannot be restrained by the others.’ 12
 Rangatira, in short, had great influence over their hapu, but little actual 
authority beyond that conferred on them by the wider community to 
implement the will of the group. As Angela Ballara notes, decision-making 
was ‘a matter of discussion, compromise, and consensus . . . [which] almost 
always – save in the case of slaves or client hapu – called for the voluntary 
assent of the persuaded rather than obedience to any authority’.13 If there 
was an incentive to take the word of the chief seriously it lay in the fact 
that the rangatira was considered the personal embodiment of the mana 
of the hapu. His misfortunes and reversals would be shared by the wider 
community and this often created a good reason for both chiefs and their 
communities to co-operate.14
 The question, then, is whether the role, status and authority of rangatira 
was enhanced or diminished in the post-contact era. Many early observers, 
assuming that the authority of the chiefs had earlier been more or less 
absolute, could not fail to conclude that this had subsequently suffered a 
serious and almost crippling decline. But if a more realistic starting point is 
adopted then the consequences of early European contact on chieftainship 
appear more mixed.
 In some respects the new environment necessarily strengthened the 
hand of the rangatira. The largely self-regulating pre-contact world created 
little scope for chiefly intervention on a regular basis.15 This could not be 
said for the early decades of the nineteenth century. One of the areas in 
which rangatira had always had an acknowledged role, for example, was 
in distributing the commonly-held resources of the community. In the 
early contact era the range and sheer quantity of such resources increased 
significantly and the chief often assumed an important role as entrepreneur 
and intermediary between his people and European traders. Although not 
always the case, payments for work undertaken by hapu members might, for 
example, be made solely to the rangatira, who would then be responsible 
for distributing these more widely, reinforcing his customary role as a focal 
point for the accumulation and distribution of tribal wealth.16
 The introduction of Christianity, and its impact on chieftainship, also 
requires consideration. Many historians have argued that chiefs proved the 
most resistant members of their communities to the new religion, fearing its 
impact on their own mana, tapu and social standing, though this assertion 
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has been questioned by others.17 There is, it has to be said, considerable 
anecdotal evidence in support of the former case.18 It seems beyond doubt 
that many rangatira did deplore the levelling consequences of Christianity 
upon their own mana and remained resistant to the new faith. But there 
were undoubtedly also some rangatira who saw opportunities as well as 
threats in the new religion, including tohunga who perceived the chance to 
enhance their own standing by harnessing the energies of the new faith, 
in much the same way that they had been acknowledged as experts in the 
existing cultural practices.19
 Perhaps the most accurate overall assessment as to the impact of the 
pre-colonial era on the authority of the chiefs would be to say that it was 
mixed. If some rangatira saw religious change as a threat to their social 
status, others perceived that the new environment offered opportunities to 
enhance their mana through trade or other means. Many Europeans found 
it more convenient to work through chiefs rather than negotiating with large 
hapu over all manner of issues, further enhancing the ability of rangatira to 
control matters. It is this political dimension, for want of a better description, 
that is the focus of the remainder of this paper.
 The appointment of James Busby as British Resident for New Zealand in 
1832 came in response to a letter sent by a number of Northland rangatira 
to the British monarch a year earlier. These developments marked the 
intensification of a relationship between northern Maori especially and the 
British Crown which was first established in earnest with Governor Philip 
King’s various dealings with the Northland tribes from the 1790s onwards.20 
The background to Busby’s appointment and the successes and failures 
of his efforts in New Zealand have been discussed at length elsewhere,21 
but Busby’s role as an agent of socio-cultural and political change among 
the northern tribes is less well-known. Yet almost from the time of his 
arrival in New Zealand Busby set about challenging existing leadership and 
governance structures among northern Maori in his efforts to manufacture 
a more centralized form of government, open to his ready manipulation on 
behalf of the British Crown.
 Busby, soon after landing at the Bay of Islands in May 1833, responded 
to the earlier 1831 petition of the northern chiefs, which asked King William 
for protection.22 The response, read to a gathering of some 22 rangatira 
assembled at Paihia mission station on 17 May 1833, explained that Busby 
had been sent to them as a ‘kaiwhakarite’, or intermediary between the 
two peoples. By the appointment of Busby, it was declared, the King was 
increasing the chiefly authority of the rangatira of New Zealand.23 But as 
James Busby later explained to his brother Alexander, his aim in establishing 
close working relationships with the chiefs was to give him ‘almost entire 
authority over the Northern part of the Island’.24 A kind of indirect rule 
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through the rangatira remained his objective throughout the early part of his 
residency. In various guises it might also be said to have been the prevailing 
objective of Crown officials for at least the next three decades.25
 This approach was entirely consistent with the instructions issued to 
Busby, which had required him to exert his influence over the chiefs at an 
early date in order to bring about a more settled state of affairs.26 Given 
the unwillingness to provide the British Resident with military backing, 
this was about the best Busby could hope to achieve. Yet Busby soon 
learnt that any notions he may have garnered from early published works 
on New Zealand describing a relatively hierarchical social structure not that 
dissimilar from the English one were erroneous. He had brought with him 
presents of clothing for 15 rangatira to be distributed following the initial 
hui, only to be informed by the missionaries that there were no less than 
40 persons of equal standing to whom it would be necessary to make such 
gifts in order to avoid giving offence to any of them. While Busby hastily 
made arrangements to borrow a few pairs of blankets from the missionaries 
in order to make alternative presents to the rangatira, he further learnt that 
it would be necessary to lay on a feast for the entire body of assembled 
Maori, numbering some 500 to 600 people in total.27
 Busby quickly concluded that the existing authority of rangatira was 
insufficient to allow meaningful governance on any feasible scale. He 
noted that chiefly jealousies would conspire against any proposals towards 
a confederated form of government in the short-term, although he took 
steps to overcome such division by insisting on dealing with the chiefs 
in a ‘collective capacity only’.28 Not only this, but as the Resident further 
reported in 1834, Maori and British notions of justice were so completely 
contrary that he could ‘hold out but little hope of being able to maintain 
order through the power of the native Chiefs’.29
 It must, at first, have seemed to Busby like a minor triumph when in 
January 1836 two tribes contending ownership of lands at Whananaki agreed 
to take their claims before the British Resident for mediation. But as fierce 
debate raged between the parties assembled in front of Busby’s house, one 
of the groups opened fire on the other. Busby later reported that the floor 
of his house was soon ‘covered with blood of the wounded men’, whilst by 
some accounts at least two people were killed in the attack.30 Having at 
length and with great difficulty eventually succeeded in preventing a ‘general 
massacre’, Busby was left to deal with the aftermath of the incident, which 
he firmly believed had been premeditated.
 The incident produced at least some encouraging news for Busby. 
The injured party informed the British Resident that ‘they had given up 
their native practices, and would leave with me the reproach of their 
Countrymen’.31 But Busby soon discovered ‘a disposition to pass the matter 
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over very lightly; if not to justify it according to native usages’.32 He might 
have considered the whole incident an affront to the King of England which 
demanded a vigorous response, but perhaps the most surprising thing about 
this whole incident was the participants’ failure to seek utu for those slain 
– an omission evidently felt keenly by some of the relatives of the killed 
and wounded.33
 The complexity of the situation confronting Busby is illustrated by an 
earlier incident in which he experienced the Maori justice system at close 
range. In April 1834 a group of Maori broke in to his storehouse at Waitangi, 
firing muskets at him and causing a minor wound in consequence of a 
splinter striking him in the cheek. One of the parties initially accused was 
suspected of taking utu from Busby for the desecration of an urupa by a 
Maori resident at Waitangi; others accused of the attack had threatened to 
seek payment for the false allegations levelled against them; and meanwhile, 
when suspicion for a time fell upon hapu from the Okiato area, it was 
proposed to gain utu by attacking the stores of local settlers.34
 Finally, in October 1834, nearly six months after the original attack, the 
true culprit was unearthed, and eventually confessed to having fired the 
shot at Busby. While Busby somewhat ludicrously insisted that Reti, a local 
rangatira, and two of his slaves who had also joined in the attack, should 
be executed, the missionaries instead proposed a compromise punishment 
involving the confiscation of the chief’s land and his banishment from that 
part of the island.35
 A small group of rangatira assembled to determine Reti’s fate and 
somewhat reluctantly confirmed the proposals for the confiscation of a 
few hundred acres of land followed by Reti’s exile. HMS Alligator had 
reached the Bay of Islands just days earlier, fresh from its bloody assault on 
Taranaki Maori in retaliation for the Harriet affair,36 and Henry Williams 
for one seemed to believe that its presence had been the decisive factor in 
securing consent to the confiscation.37 Reti now denied any involvement in 
the original crime, however, and declared his intention to ignore any order 
to leave.38 Meanwhile, the remaining rangatira proved reluctant to take any 
actions to enforce their earlier determination.39 The problem, as Busby had 
correctly predicted, was that they were incapable of taking any action in the 
matter without personally incriminating themselves in a move which would 
demand utu from the offended party.40 Quite how, under these circumstances, 
Busby had imagined anyone being found who could execute the accused 
chief without fear of serious repercussions defies imagination.
 In various ways, then, Busby had endeavoured to get the northern rangatira 
to act in concert in matters he deemed important. And although his record on 
this front was mixed, he did achieve two notable successes with the selection 
of a national flag in March 1834, and the signing of He Wakaputanga o te 
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Rangatiratanga o Nu Tirene (the Declaration of Independence) in October 
1835.41 But at the same time that Busby was encouraging rangatira to 
work together to establish supra-tribal institutions of authority capable of 
administering the affairs of the country under the protection of the British, 
he was also working at another level to elevate the authority of the higher-
ranked chiefs.
 Following the initial signing of He Wakaputanga, for example, Busby 
commented that the Declaration settled the basis of government for the 
country on the principle he had always recommended, namely ‘that the 
powers of a Government should be vested exclusively in the Chiefs of Tribes, 
in their Collective capacity’. This, Busby asserted, ‘I conceived to be the 
form of Government which naturally strings from the actual condition of 
the people’.42 The viewpoint expressed on this occasion was not exactly in 
accordance with his later statements on the same subject. Writing in response 
to Sir William Martin’s attack on the government’s handling of affairs at 
Taranaki in 1860, Busby noted with respect to the pre-1840 period that:
In New Zealand, law had no existence, and there was an equal absence 
of authority. No man admitted the right of another to interfere with his 
conduct. We are accustomed to speak of the “chiefs” of New Zealand, 
in terms which to our minds convey the idea of authority. But the chiefs 
had no authority. Those were “principal chiefs” who, being free men, had 
acquired that ascendancy which, superior natural ability and strength of 
mind always obtain over the less gifted and more timid majority, as well 
as those who stood nearest in lineal descent to the original progenitor 
from whom they all traced their descent. But, however naturally gifted, 
or lineally descended, no man claimed a right to subject another to his 
will.43
Yet Busby’s 1860 depiction of an anarchic, free-for-all society in which 
might invariably triumphed over right was no more accurate than his earlier, 
neat and convenient conception of a government of the (principal) chiefs.44 
In reality, decision-making processes were collective, and although there was 
no overall authority governing relations between tribes, mechanisms such as 
taua muru (plundering or punishment raids) and runanga (tribal councils) 
existed to mediate disputes between neighbouring communities.45
 Busby’s efforts in the 1830s to establish a confederated government of 
the chiefs ran counter to this collective decision-making ethos in that it 
made no effort to ensure the participation of the lesser rangatira. William 
Barrett Marshall, who was present at the hui during which a national flag 
was selected, observed that ‘the spectacle might have been rendered an 
imposing one, but for the attempt made to separate between the noblesse 
and the canaille of New Zealand, by confining the choice of the flag to 
the former, and excluding altogether the voice of the latter from taking 
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part in the affair’.46 Marshall noted that this move had prompted ‘no small 
discontent’ on the part of those excluded. He was critical of Busby’s efforts 
to stifle free and open debate on the issue, and observed that at the end of 
the meeting, while some adjourned to a feast, others assembled ‘without 
respect of persons, to listen to the disputes brought forward by individuals, 
according to the immemorial custom of every public assembly’.47 Busby 
himself had warned those assembled for the occasion that although they 
were free to choose whichever flag they wanted, the decision ‘must be 
made by the principal Chiefs only’.48 On another occasion he admitted 
that at the hui at which the Declaration of Independence had been signed 
‘It was . . . extremely difficult to get the Chiefs to separate themselves 
from their connexions, and to form themselves into anything like a regular 
assembly’.49
 Busby proposed other initiatives to distance – in some cases, literally – the 
principal rangatira from their people, including the construction of separate 
accommodation for them when they came together for regular meetings of 
the assembly of confederated chiefs.50 His aim to simplify the process of 
exerting influence and control over the tribes through the establishment of a 
clearly defined governing hierarchy with definite powers was to be shared by 
subsequent Crown administrations that were ‘looking for a comprehensible 
and comprehensive body politic with which to negotiate land purchases’,51 
or simply seeking to undermine the ‘beastly communism’ of Maori society 
through the establishment of something more or less replicating British 
class structures.52 These measures only began to achieve real results after 
1865, especially once the Native Land Court began to undermine communal 
management of lands. Throughout, the aim had been indirect rule based on 
elevating the standing of the chiefs within their communities for limited 
purposes but without providing for anything approaching genuine partnership 
with the Crown or settler bodies (as seen all too clearly by the exclusion of 
Maori from parliamentary and provincial assemblies under the New Zealand 
Constitution Act). By the 1850s these ulterior motives had become all too 
apparent to many Maori communities, providing the impetus for responses 
such as revived runanga and the emergence of the Kingitanga. But that is 
another story.53
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